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Abstract: 
 
In most traditional macro-economic models of the Netherlands the wage equation is specified by a 
Phillips curve, in which wage growth is negatively related to the unemployment rate. This paper 
shows, however, that wage formation can better be described by the so-called wage curve, in which 
the wage level instead of wage growth depends negatively on the unemployment rate. 
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In policy analysis with traditional macro-economic models of the Netherlands, like the 
Freia-Kompas model of the Central Planning Bureau (Van den Berg et al., 1988), the wage 
equation plays an important role. In a standard wage equation private wage growth is explained by 
the percentage change of consumer prices, labour productivity, the forward shifting of income taxes 
and social premiums and the change and the level of the difference between the unemployment rate 
and the frictional unemployment rate. The latter effect is the so-called Phillips curve effect. 
Simulation results of all kind of government policies depend crucially on these various elements of 
the wage equation. For example, a reduction of indirect taxes will reduce wages because of its 
linkage to the consumer price. Similarly, wages will also be reduced when income taxes or social 
premiums fall. 
 However, because of the inclusion of the Phillips curve effect these kind of effects are 
likely to be only relevant in the short and medium term. Since the fall in wages induces a reduction 
of unemployment, the Phillips curve effect will generate a positive impulse on wage growth, which 
will continue as long as unemployment lies below its steady state value. Therefore, in the long term 
the real wage rate will return to its steady state value and so will unemployment. This implies that a 
permanent change in the tax burden has no long run effects on unemployment. 
 Recently the Phillips curve has been criticized for several reasons (Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1989; Christofides and Oswald, 1989). It is argued that wage formation can better be 
described by the so-called wage curve, in which wage growth depends only on the change in 
unemployment and not on the level of unemployment. Unemployment would therefore have a 
downward influence on wage levels and not on wage growth. This has important policy 
implications, since it implies that a permanent reduction in tax rates will have long term effects on 
unemployment, that do not diminish by the Phillips curve effect. The other side of the coin is that 
unemployment will not automaticly return to the level of frictional unemployment in the long run if 
other determinants of the wage equation, like the direct or indirect tax rate, remain unchanged. 
 The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether this claim also applies to the Dutch 
situation. The contents of the paper are as follows. Section two sketches the theoretical background 
of the Phillips curve and the wage curve. Section three reports the estimation results. Section four 
summarizes the main conclusions. 
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2. Theoretical background of the Phillips curve and wage curve 
 
The Phillips curve 
 
Much of the literature on empirical research of wage formation stems from the work of Phillips 
(1958). Phillips started from the proposition that the price of any product changes in response to 
excess demand. Applying this proposition to the labour market leads to the famous Phillips curve, 
which relates wage growth to the level of unemployment. Phillips' model is one in which employers 
bid up wages competitively in order to attract labour away from other firms. When demand for 
labour is high and there are few unemployed, employers will bid up wage rates rapidly to attract the 
most productive labour. On the other hand, when labour demand is low and unemployment is high, 
workers will be reluctant to accept wage cuts and hence wage rates fall only slowly. Phillips 
therefore notes that the relation between unemployment and the wage growth is likely to be highly 
non-linear. In addition, Phillips argues that wage growth might also depend on the change in the 
unemployment rate. In a period of rising business activity, employers will be bidding more 
vigorously than they would be when the average unemployment rate was the same but business 
activity was falling. This creates loops in the Phillips curve. This is often labelled the weak Phillips 
curve effect. 
 In a subsequent paper Lipsey (1960) builds on the work of Phillips. In contrast to Phillips 
he argues that the origin of the loops  in the macro Phillips curve could be found in the 
aggregation of micro labour markets, which are affected differently by fluctuations in aggregate 
demand. A second innovation of Lipsey in the Phillips curve concerned his inclusion of the cost of 
living index as an explanatory variable.  
 Phelps (1968) and Friedman (1968) stressed the role of expectations. Whereas Phelps 
focused on the influence of expectations with respect to wages of other firms, Friedman builds on 
the paper of Lipsey (1960) and considers the endogeneity of expectations of consumer prices. From 
his paper the Phillips curve was redefined into the so-called 'expectations augmented' Phillips 
curve: 
 
(1) _ log w = _ log pce + f (ur, _ ur)  fur<0 ; f_ur<0 
 
where w denotes the wage rate, pce is the expected consumption price, and ur the unemployment 
rate.  
 As can be seen from equation (1), in the 'expectations augmented' Phillips curve wage 
growth is only related to expected growth in consumer prices, the unemployment rate, and the 
change in the unemployment rate. Typical wage bargaining factors, which are viewed as highly 
relevant in Dutch wage formation, do not show up. Because of this shortcoming, Dutch researchers 
generally used an extended version of equation (1), that includes other explanatory variables like 
the rate of income taxes and social premiums and labour productivity (Graafland, 1988; Brunia and 
Kuper, 1990). A theoretical justification of this 'bargaining augmented' Phillips curve was given by 
Knoester and Van der Windt (1987). In their model unions and employers' organisations bargain 
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over wage growth. The wage outcome is assumed to be a weighted average of wage growth claims 
of unions and wage growth offers of employers' organisations. The Phillips curve effect is 
introduced by the assumption that the bargaining power of the union, which determines the weight 
of unions claims in the wage outcome, is negatively related to the level (and the change) of the 
unemployment rate. Wage growth claims are assumed to be related to relative changes in consumer 
prices, labour productivity and employee tax rates, whereas wage growth offers are linked to 
marginal labour productivity growth, which is determined by relative changes in value added prices, 
labour productivity and employer tax rates. From these assumptions the following wage growth 
equation results: 
 
(2) _ log w =  a1 _ log py + (1-a1) _ log pc + _ log h + a2 _ log (1-tpw) + 
 
   a3 _ log (1-tpl) - a4 ur - a5 _ ur + a6 
 
where py denotes value added price, h labour productivity, tpw the rate of social premiums paid by 
employers, and tpl the rate of social premiums and income taxes paid by employees. 
  Equation (2) is still used for policy evaluation in the Netherlands. In the model of the 
Central Planning Bureau (1989) a1 equals 0., a2 -0.85, a3 -0.25, a4 0.25 and a5 0.45. The only 
difference is that in the Freia-Kompas model the weak Phillips curve effect is replaced by a positive 
influence of the relative change in employment in order to link up with the 'insider-outsider' theory 
(Carruth and Oswald, 1987; Lindbeck and Snower, 1986). In the model of the University of 
Groningen (Kuipers et al., 1988) a1 equals 0, a2 -0.86, a3 -0.43, a5 0, whereas the coefficient of the 
Phillips curve effect, which is specified as the reciprocal of the unemployment rate, equals 6.64. 
 
The wage curve  
 
 In the international literature another route has been followed, which builds on a largely 
neglected paper of Sargan (1964). In this newer tradition (Oswald, 1982; Nickell and Andrews, 
1983; Layard and Nickell, 1986; Dimsdale et al.,1989) the wage equation is derived from 
microeconomic theory of wage bargaining. 1  The main elements of this approach can be 
summarized as follows.2 
 Suppose that the wage level is the outcome of a bargaining process between a 
representative worker and employer and can be represented by the generalized Nash bargaining 
solution: 
                                                 
    
1In this paper we only discuss the wage bargaining model. Johnson and Layard (1986) present two additional models 
from which wage level curves can be derived. The first model is based on equilibrium between labour supply and labour 
demand. Empirical research in Graafland (1991a) shows that this model is rejected for the Netherlands. The second model 
is the efficiency wage model. The empirical relevance of this model for the Netherlands is still largely unexplored.   
    
2For a presentation of a more extended model, see Graafland (1990). 
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(3) max g = α log (u(w)-) + (1-α) log (pi(w)-)  u'(w)>0 ; pi'(w)<0 ; 0<α<1 ; 
  w       u(w)> ; pi(w)> 
 
where u and pi denote the utility functions of the worker and employer over wages. The workers' 
utility is positively related to the wage level, whereas the employers' utility is negatively related to 
the wage level. The utility levels  and  are the threat points of the worker respectively employer 
and reflect their utility obtained during a breakdown of the bargaining process. α is an exogenous 
given parameter, representing the relative bargaining strength of the worker. From the first-order 
and second order condition of equation (3) it follows that any exogenous variable, that increases the 
threat point utility of the worker ( ) or decreases the threat point utility of the employers' 
organisation () will induce a rise in the wage outcome.3 
 In most of the literature unemployment enters the model through the assumption that the 
threat point of the worker () is related to the income received if the worker has to search for another 
job (Blanchflower et al., 1989; Christofides and Oswald, 1989; Graafland, 1991b; Hoel and 
Nymoen, 1988; Nickell and Andrews, 1983), defined as: 
 
(4)  = pru rp w* + (1-pru) w* 
 
where pru denotes the proportion of time spent unemployed before finding a job in another firm, rp 
the replacement ratio, and w* the macro wage. As long as the worker has not found another job, he 
receives an unemployment benefit which is equal to the replacement ratio times the wage rate. In 
general, the proportion of time spent unemployed before finding a job will be positively related to 
the macro unemployment rate. Hence, a rise in the unemployment rate will reduce the threat point 
of the worker and cause a fall in the wage outcome of the bargain. 
 In other models, like Pissarides (1990), unemployment enters the model through the 
assumption that the threat point of the employers' organisation depends positively on the macro 
unemployment rate. Here the argument is that a rise of unemployment will decrease search costs for 
employers because the average duration of vacancies will diminish. Hence labour turnover costs 
will fall and this enhances the threat point of the employer. 
 Either way, the bargaining model implies that unemployment will have a negative 
influence on the wage level, not on wage growth.4 This is in contrast with the Phillips curve and 
implies that there will be a stable relation between the wage level and the unemployment rate. This 
is called the wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1989). The location of the wage curve will 
depend on all other exogenous variables, that enter the wage bargaining model. Likely candidates 
                                                 
    
3For a derivation, see appendix 1. 
    
4One referee noted that the level of the unemployment rate might still influence wage growth in the context of a 
bargaining model, if the bargaining parties consider employment in their utility function, and if changes in employment 
require adjustment costs. 
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for these other explanatory variables are producer prices, labour productivity, consumer prices, 
average tax rates on labour income, and replacement ratios (Graafland, 1991b). Producer prices and 
labour productivity increase employers' utility (pi) by increasing profits. This induces a reallocation 
to labour income by increasing wages. Consumer prices and tax rates have an ambiguous influence 
on wages, because they reduce both marginal and average worker's utility (u'(w) respectively u). 
Finally, wages will also be positively influenced by the replacement ratio, because this increases the 
threat point of the worker () by improving his income during a break-down of the bargaining 
process. 
 After linearization the solution of the wage bargaining model can be written as a wage 
level equation, in which the wage level depends on the level of the rate of unemployment and other 
explanatory variables. Of course this wage level equation can be rewritten as a wage growth 
equation, in which only the weak Phillips curve effect is relevant. In the context of equation (2) this 
means that a4 is zero.  
 As an example of a macro-economic model of the Netherlands with a wage curve we 
mention MORKMON II (Fase et al., 1990). The wage equation of MORKMON II is specified as: 
 
(5) log w = 0.77 log w
-1 - 0.88 _ log pc + 1.05 (log pc - 0.77 log pc-1) + 0.85 (log h -  
 
    0.77 log h
-1) + 0.90 (tpw - 0.77 tpw-1) + 0.16 tpl - 0.43 ur-½ - 1.41 
 
The coefficient of the lagged wage rate differs from one. Therefore, in the long run a wage curve is 
obtained with a stable relationship between the level of real wages and the unemployment rate, that 
shifts with changes in the rate of direct taxes and social premiums paid by employers and 
employees, the indirect tax rate, and the terms of trade (through the consumer price). 
 
 
3. Phillips curve versus wage curve: estimation results 
 
In this section we will investigate whether wage formation in the Netherlands exhibits a Phillips 
curve effect or not. We proceed as follows. First, we will investigate the empirical relevance of the 
Phillips curve effect in the context of a wage growth equation like equation (2). Second, we will 
estimate a wage level equation, and compare the statistics of this equation with that of the wage 
growth equation. Third, we will report some encompassing test statistics of the wage growth and 
wage level equation. 
 
Estimation results of wage growth equation  
 
 The estimation results of the wage growth equation are reported in Table 1. The estimation 
period is set at 1967-1989, because data of the replacement ratio are only available from 1965 
onwards. We use annual data. Data sources are described in appendix 2. Because of possible 
simultaneity between wages, producer prices, consumer prices, and labour productivity we use 
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2SLS with import prices and lagged values of consumer and producer prices and labour 
productivity as instruments for current prices and current labour productivity. 
 Table 1 presents three estimation results, which differ with respect to the specification of 
the unemployment effects on wage formation. In column one the unemployment rate is linearly 
specified, like in the Freia-Kompas model of the Central Planning Bureau (1989). The estimation 
result shows that only the weak Phillips curve effect has a significant influence on wage growth, 
whereas the strong Phillips curve effect has not. In the second column the unemployment rate is 
logarithmicly specified. Now both the weak Phillips curve effect and the strong Phillips curve 
effect appear to have a significant negative influence on wage growth. However, the overall fit 
drops. The third column shows the estimation results if a reciprocal specification of the 
unemployment rate is used, as in Kuipers et al. (1988) and Brunia and Kuper (1990). Again the 
strong Phillips curve effect is found to be significant, but in comparison with column (1) the overall 
fit drops. With respect to the other explanatory variables the estimation results are quite  
 
Table 1  Estimation results of wage growth equation 
 
         (1)      (2)      (3) 
 
    _ log(w/pc) _ log(w/pc) _ log(w/pc) 
 
 
_ log (py/pc)    0.63  0.51  0.48 
     (2.64)  (1.70)  (1.70) 
 
_ log ha    0.68  0.54  0.59 
     (7.74)  (4.41)  (4.05) 
 
_ log (1-tpw)    -0.81  -0.83  -0.76 
     (3.78)  (2.64)  (1.99) 
 
_ log (1-tpl)    -0.45  -0.35  -0.33 
     (3.56)  (2.32)  (1.89) 
 
_ log rp
-1    0.23  0.14  0.16 
     (4.32)  (1.84)  (1.67) 
 
constant    0.01  -0.03  -0.01 
     (1.02)  (2.65)  (1.34) 
 
unemployment effectsb   linear  logarithmic  reciprocal 
 
weak Phillips curve   -0.87  -0.03  0.02 
     (3.49)  (2.42)  (1.11) 
 
Phillips curve    -0.13  -0.01  0.03 
     (1.26)  (2.57)  (2.61) 
 
 
Adjusted R2    0.95  0.91  0.86 
Standard error    0.60  0.84  1.06 
Durbin Watson test   2.39  1.75  1.23 
 
a
 Labour productivity is related for 25 % to current values and for 75 % to one year lagged values. 
b
 The unemployment effects are one year lagged. The coefficient of the reciprocal specification is multiplied by 100. 
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similar. As an indicator for inflation both producer prices and consumer prices play a role in wage 
formation. Secondly, labour productivity growth appears to be only partly shifted forward into 
higher wages. Thirdly, changes in both the rate of employers payroll taxes and employees income 
taxes and social premiums have a positive influence on wage growth, the first effect being about 
twice as strong as the latter effect. Fourthly, the replacement ratio has a positive influence on wages, 
which is only significant in the case of a linear specification of the unemployment rate. Finally, it is 
noted that in all cases the overall fit reduces if other lag structures are used for the unemployment 
rate or other explanatory variables.5 
 
Estimation results of wage level equation 
 
 Table 2 reports the estimation results of the wage level equation with a linear 
unemployment effect.6 For comparison with Table 1 we use the same dependent variable as in the 
wage growth equation and include the lagged real wage rate as explanatory variable. Note that if 
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable differs from minus one, the estimation result 
implies a partial adjustment process. If the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable does not 
differ from minus one, the wage growth equation implies a wage level equation without partial 
adjustment. 
 
 
Table 2  Estimation results of wage level equation 
 
         (1)       (2)  
 
     _ log(w/pc)   _ log(w/pc) 
 
 
log (w/pc)
-1    -0.99   -1.01 
     (10.01)   (13.74) 
 
log (py/pc)    0.51   0.52 
     (6.09)   (6.61) 
 
log ha     0.70   0.71 
     (9.36)   (12.36) 
 
log (1-tpw)    -1.03   -1.01 
     (8.42)   (-) 
 
log (1-tpl)   -0.54   -0.57 
                                                 
    
5For estimation results with alternative lag structures, see appendix 3. 
    
6We also estimated wage level equations with a logarithmic and reciprocal unemployment effect, but these equations 
appeared to have similar standard errors as the wage growth equations with a logarithmic respectively reciprocal 
unemployment effect. 
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     (4.75)   (8.12) 
 
log rp
-1     0.31   0.31 
     (5.85)   (7.92) 
 
ur
-1     -1.17   -1.19 
     (7.13)   (9.38) 
 
constant    -0.79   -0.81 
     (4.15)   (5.06) 
 
 
Adjusted R2    0.97   0.97 
Standard error    0.46   0.44 
Durbin Watson test   2.09   2.09 
 
 
a
 Labour productivity is related for 25 % to current values and for 75 % to one year lagged values. 
 
 
 We present two estimation results. In the first column the coefficient of the rate of social 
premiums paid by employers exceeds its theoretical maximum value, which equals one (although 
not significantly). In the second column we therefore restricted the long term coefficient of the rate 
of social premiums paid by employers to one. From a comparison of the estimation results of Table 
2 with those of column (1) in Table 1 it can be seen that estimation of a wage level equation instead 
of a wage growth equation reduces the standard error. This implies that the wage level specification 
fits better with Dutch data on wage formation than the wage growth specification. 
 
Encompassing tests 
 
The estimation results in Tables 1 and 2 show that the empirical relevance of the Phillips curve 
effect is disputable. First, the Phillips curve effect is found to be only significant in the wage 
growth equations with a logarithmic or reciprocal specification of the unemployment rate. The 
standard errors of these equations are, however, relatively high compared to that of the wage 
growth equation in which a linear specification of the unemployment rate is used, and in which the 
Phillips curve effect is not found to be significant. Second, if we re-estimate the wage equation in 
the form of a wage level equation with no Phillips curve effect at all, the standard error of the 
regression is even lower. 
 These conclusions can be checked by encompassing tests. As a simple preliminary test we 
use an encompassing test of Davidson and MacKinnon (1981). This test consists of estimating an 
encompassing wage equation with the fitted values of both alternative equations as regressors: 
 
(6) y = δ _1 + (1-δ) _2 
 
If equation 1 is true, then the true value of δ is one. If equation 2 is true, the true value of δ is zero. 
We tested the wage growth equation with a linear specification of the unemployment effects against 
either the wage growth equations with a logarithmic respectively reciprocal specification of the 
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unemployment effects, and the wage level equation. The test statistics are reported in Table 3. In all 
cases δ denotes the coefficient of the fitted values of the wage growth equation with a linear 
specification of unemployment effects. 
 From the estimation results of δ in column (1) and (2) in Table 3 it can be seen that the 
wage growth equation with either a logarithmic or reciprocal specification of the unemployment 
effects is rejected against the wage growth equation with a linear  
 
Table 3 A simple encompassing test 
 
    wage growth equations   wage growth versus 
         wage level equation 
   linear versus  linear versus 
   logarithmic  reciprocal 
 
δ     0.85   0.87   0.27 
t-value    (4.74)   (7.03)   (1.72) 
 
 
specification of the unemployment effects, because δ differs significantly from zero in these cases 
(and not from one). On the other hand, from the third column it can be seen that the wage growth 
equation is rejected against the wage level equation, since δ differs significantly from one in this 
case (and not from zero). 
 A more general test is provided if we estimate encompassing wage equations, in which all 
coefficients of the underlying equations are freely estimated. In this case the F-test can be used to 
see which one of the underlying equations can be rejected (Mizon and Richard, 1986). The 
encompassing equation of the wage growth equations of Table 1 is specified as: 
 
   5 
(7)  _log(w/pc) = Σ bi _log xi + b6 _ur-1 + b7 ur-1 + b8 _log ur-1 + b9 log ur-1 + 
            i=1 
 
   b10 _(1/ur-1) + b11 (1/ur-1) + b12 
 
 
x1 - x5 denote respectively the ratio between producer prices and consumer prices, labour 
productivity, the complements of the employers' social premium rate and the employees' tax and 
social premium rate, and the replacement ratio. The encompassing wage equation of the wage 
growth equation with a linear specification of the unemployment effects (column (1) of Table 1) 
and the wage level equation (column (2) of Table 2) can be specified as: 
 
   5       5 
(8)  _log(w/pc) = Σ ci _log xi + c6 _ur-1 + Σ di log xi + d6 ur-1 + d3 log(w/pc)-1 + d7 
           i=1     i=1 
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The wage growth equation results if the parameters d1 - d5 are zero, whereas the wage level 
equation results if c1 - c6 are zero and if d3 differs from zero. The F-test statistics are reported in 
Table 4. 
 
Table 4 F-test statisticsa 
 
 
wage growth equations versus   linear  logarithmic  reciprocal 
encompassing wage growth equation (7) 
 
F-test statisticb     1.03  4.29  8.13 
 
 
wage growth and wage level equation wage growth wage level 
versus encompassing wage equation (8) 
 
F-test statisticc     5.14  2.18 
 
 
a
 The F-test statistic is defined as ((SSRi-SSR)/m)/(SSR/(d-1)), where SSRi denotes the sum of squared residuals of the 
restricted wage equation, SSR the sum of squared residuals of the encompassing wage equation, m the number of 
restrictions, and d the degree of freedoms of the encompassing equation. 
b
 The critical value of F(m,d) with m=4 and d=11 equals 3.36 at the 5 % level. 
c
 The critical value of F(m,d) with m=5 (respectively m=6) and d=10 equals 3.33 (3.22) at the 5 % level. 
 
 
 Table 4 yields similar conclusions as Table 3. From the upper part of Table 4 it can be seen 
that the wage growth equations with a logarithmic and reciprocal specification of the 
unemployment effects are rejected against the encompassing wage growth equation (7), whereas 
the wage growth equation with a linear specification of the unemployment effects is not. From the 
second part of Table 4 it can be seen that the latter is again rejected against the encompassing wage 
equation (8). On the other hand, the wage level equation is not rejected against the encompassing 
equation (8). From this we conclude that the standard wage growth equation with a Phillips curve 
effect gives a deficient description of wage formation in the Netherlands, whereas the wage level 
equation with a wage curve does not. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
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This paper shows that the empirical relevance of the Phillips curve effect in the wage equation 
cannot be confirmed by empirical research. In wage growth equations with a linear specification of 
the unemployment rate only the change in the unemployment rate has a significant negative effect 
on wage growth, whereas the level of the unemployment rate is insignificant. If a logarithmic or 
reciprocal specification is used, the Phillips curve effect is found to have a significant influence on 
wage growth, but the overall fit worsens. On the other hand, re-estimation of the wage equation in 
the form of a wage level equation improves the fit. Encompassing tests of the wage level equation 
and the wage growth equation shows that the wage growth equations with a Phillips curve effect 
are rejected against a wage level equation with a linear specification of the unemployment rate. 
 The analysis implies that government tax policies or social economic policies have 
permanent effects on the unemployment rate, which do not disappear in the long run because of a 
possible compensating effect of the Phillips curve. Another implication is that unemployment will 
not automaticly return to the level of frictional unemployment in the long run, if other determinants 
of the wage equation, like the direct or indirect tax rates or replacement ratio remain unchanged. 
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Appendix 1 Derivation of wage bargaining model 
 
The first-order condition for maximum utility is: 
 
(1.1) α u'(w)/(u(w)-) + (1-α) pi'(w)/(pi(w)-) = 0 
 
Differentiation gives: 
 
(1.2) {α u''(w)/(u(w)-) - α (u'(w)/(u(w)-))2 + (1-α) pi''(w)/(pi(w)-) - 
 
 (1-α) (pi'(w)/(pi(w)-))2} dw = - α u'(w)/((u(w)-))2 d - (1-α) pi'(w)/((pi(w)-))2} d 
 
From the second order condition for maximum utility: 
 
(1.3) α u''(w)/(u(w)-) - α (u'(w)/(u(w)-))2 + (1-α) pi''(w)/(pi(w)-) - 
 
 (1-α) (pi'(w)/(pi(w)-))2 < 0 
 
it follows that the term in the left side of equation (1.2) is negative. Since u'(w), u(w)-, and pi(w)- are positive, whereas 
pi'(w) is negative, it can be concluded that   has a positive influence and   a negative influence on the wage outcome.  
 
Appendix 2 Data and sources 
 
Most data are from internal sources of the Central Planning Bureau. The replacement ratio is from an internal paper by F. 
Krapels of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The time series are constructed as follows: 
 
w = (wb-wk) / (lb - lk -lz) 
h = (yb-yk) / (lb - lk) 
tpw = slw / wb 
tpl = ttl / wb 
ur = u / ps 
 
where: 
 
wb : wage costs of enterprises 
wk : wage costs of the medical sector and other non-private market services 
lb : employment of enterprises (labour years) 
lk : employment of the medical sector and other non-private market services (labour years) 
lz : self-employment (labour years) 
yb : value added of enterprises excluding mining and quarrying and real estate (constant prices) 
yk : value added of the medical sector and other non-private market services (constant prices) 
slw : social premiums, paid by employers 
sll : social premiums and direct taxes on wage income, paid by employees in private sector 
u : unemployed job-seekers 
ps : labour force (persons) 
 
The other series used are defined as: 
 
pc : private consumer price 
py : price index of yb-yk 
rp : ratio between net government assistance and net average wage rate 
 
 
Appendix 3 Estimation results of wage growth equations with other lag structures 
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We experimented on four alternative lag structures:  
 
(1)half year lagged producer and consumer prices ; 
(2)a half year lagged labour productivity ; 
(3)a distributed lag in labour productivity with weights .3, .5, and .2 of unlagged, one year lagged, and two year lagged 
values ; 
(4)half year lagged unemployment rates. Because of possible simultaneity between current unemployment and wages, we 
used the one year lagged specification of the unemployment rate as the instrumental variable for the half year 
lagged specification.  
 
Table 3.1 presents the standard errors of wage equations with these alternative lag structures or combinations of them. The 
basis column reports the standard errors of the wage growth equations of Table 1. 
 
 
Table 3.1 Standard errors of wage growth equation with alternative lag structures 
 
Specification of   alternative lag structures 
unemployment 
effects  basis 1 2 3 4 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+2+4 1+3+4
  
 
linear  0.60 1.07 0.84 0.98 0.73 0.97 1.51 1.21 1.13 1.76 
 
logarithmic 0.84 0.98 1.34 1.32 0.88 1.01 1.09 0.94 0.95 1.05 
 
reciprocal 1.06 1.26 1.32 1.34 1.07 1.27 1.38 1.14 1.16 1.21 
 
 
As can be seen from Table 3.1 the standard error of the basis-specification is lower than the standard error of any other 
specification, both for the wage growth equation with a linear, logarithmic and reciprocal specification of unemployment 
effects. 
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